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------------------.;·--
-- ----------- ----~--~;;~~-Court. Uta C1 ', ... u, 
Plaint~!! and Respondent, 
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vs. No:1!92 q $q ;L 
\r. GLEN NOBLE and PERRY C. 
ADAMS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
LOUIS E. MIDGLEY, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\'"ADA vVELI.J~IAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
''"· GLEN NOBLE and PERRY C. 
ADA~fS, 
Defen(lants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 992 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants 
to recover damages for personal injuries arising out 
of an automobile accident occurring on July 3rd, 1956 
in Nebraska. 
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J~ry Trial was held in Utah ·County, the Honorable 
R. L. Tuckett, Judge, presiding. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the total amount of 
$4,500.00. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial on the 
ground of inadequate damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and 
moving 'for the new trial on the issue of damages only . 
. The Lower Court Orde.red Additur in the su1n of 
$3,000.00 "and if the plaintiff and defendants fail to 
consent to the additur within 30 days, a new trial is 
Ordered on the issu~ of damages only." 
Defendants filed a Petition for Intermediate Appeal 
to this ·Court, which was granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 3rd, 1956 plaintiff 'vas riding in a Cadillac 
driven by her brother in la":' 1\!r. House.· A Studebaker 
driven by Mrs. House, "~as travelling ahead of the 
Cadillac. In front and ahead of the Studebaker "~as a 
pickup truck pulling a house trailer. Defendant Adams, 
an e1nployee of Noble, was follo"Ting the above vehicles, 
driving a Freightliner tractor and trailer, or tnlek-
trailPr unit ( T -172). 
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The ahove vehieles were proceeding west on U.S. 30, 
Deuel County, Nebraska. That high"ray is very narrow 
(T-175), only 18 feet \\'"ide, and provides only one lane 
of tra.vPl for either \vestbound or eastbound traffic. 
The high\Yay is flanked on both sides by grain fields 
for many miles (T-105, 171). The shoulders on the high-
\vay at or near the scene of the accident were only about 
3 feet \vide (T-175). 
Ada1ns \Yas follo\ving the procession at a distance 
of about 200 feet for about 5 miles (T-172). 
~lost of the distance was on flat terrain, but the 
group eame upon a series of rolling hills, or dips, or 
s\vales (T -171; 105). The vehicles ahead of Adams would, 
ten1porarily, move out of his vision as they disappeared 
do\vn to\vards the bottom of the hill, \Vhile the truck-
trailer \Yas 1noving np to\vards thP smnmit. 
Adams, upon reaching the summit, would again 
observe the units ahead as they \Vere approaching and 
passing again out of temporary view, over the next 
summit ahead. 
The vehicles ahead of Adams traversed about three 
or four of these small dips (T-29) and the relative 
distance of about 200 feet \Vas maintained between the 
tn1ck and the Cadillac CT-172). The posted speed limit 
\Vas 50 miles per hour for truc-ks and 60 miles per hour 
for cars (T--176). 
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Immediately before the accident, Adams observed 
the vehicles again disappear below the summit of the 
hill ahead. No brake lights, or other signal appeared 
to warn Adams of any change in the speed of the cars 
ahead (T-172) (T-195). Mr. House, driver of the car 
ahead of defendant, testified he was going downhill 
when he applied brakes to slow do"\\!Jl (T-22). 
As the truck-trailer was proceeding upgrade towards 
the summit, and of course unknown to Adams_, the pickup 
truck with the house trailer behind, had run out of gas-
oline (T-181, 298), and was slowing and pulling off the 
road. The Studebaker and ·Cadillac \vere likewise forced 
to slow. When the defendant's truck reached the sum-
mit, Adams suddenly observed the cars ahead, the pickup 
truck partially off the road, stopped with the house 
trailer blocking more than half the ""'"estbound lane, 
and the Studebaker and Cadillac either stopped or vir-
tually stopped behind the house trailer. The nearest 
car, the Cadillac, was only 100 feet ahead (T-177; 196). 
An opposite bound car prevented the defendant from 
attempting to s"~erve and pass the vehicles on their left 
(T-177). 
The defendant jamn1ed his brakes and had slowed to 
about 10 to 15 miles per hour, "Then the rear of the 
Cadillac was struck (T-176; 182). After the accident, 
all vehicles \Yere in the bottom of the s"~ale, and they 
were shortly 1noved so as not to endanger other vehicles 
ap·proaching., \vhose drivers could not see the1n (T-180). 
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The plaintiff suffered a "whiplash injury" and a 
discussion of her injuries will be reserved for the Argu-
tnent. 
Defendants in their Answer and in the Pre -Trial 
Order, defended on the ground of Unavoidable Accident 
(R-6; 10) in that the defendant, Adams, as a reasonable 
and prudent driver, under the circumstances, could not 
have reasonably foreseen the events that preceded the 
accident; that he was faced with a sudden emergency; 
and that he acted reasonably under said emergency, but 
could not avoid the resulting accident. Defendants' ex-
pert \\~itness, Sgt. Laub, lTtah High,vay Patrol, testified 
that no vehicle, passenger car or truck, could stop in 
the distanre of 100 feet at a speed of 40 miles per hour 
(T-211). 
That at 40 miles per hour, any vehicle, on level road, 
would require a total distance to stop, including reaction 
time, of at least 124 feet; at 50 miles per hour 180 feet 
( T -211). That if the vehicle were travelling do'vn grade, 
it would require more distance (T-213-214). 
The Court refused to instruct the jury on any of 
the above defenses. (Defendants' Requested Instructions 
( R-:27, 28, 30) ) . 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Appellants respectfully submit two points. 
POINT ONE 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING ADDITUR TO A SUBSTANTIAL JURY VER-
DICT, AND THE VERDICT SHOULD BE REINSTATED. 
POINT TWO 
THE LOWER COURT CO·MMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN DEPRIVING THEM 
OF THEIR DEFENSES AND A NEW TRIAL, IF NECES-
SARY, SHOULD BE HEARD ON ALL THE ISSUES. 
ARGU~1:ENT 
POINT ONE 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING ADDITUR TO A SUBSTANTIAL JURY VER-
DICT, AND THE VERDICT SHOULD BE REINSTATED. 
T·he Honorable Trial Court concluded in his Order 
granting additur, the following statement: 
" ... It appears to the Court that the jury 
disregarded the Court's instructions pertaining 
to damages .... '' 
The Pre-Trial Order had framed the issues, previ-
ously asserted by defendants' in their Ans\Yer, as fol-
lows: 
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"The def(-lndants also contend that the plain-
tiff received excessive medical care and treatment, 
over and above that rPasonably necessary." 
.A. reading of the Record and Transcript of the trial, 
'vill bear out that defendants contended that plaintiff 
magnified her complaints, that she did not suffer \vith 
her injuries as grievously as her subjective complaints 
""ould have had the jury believe, and that her subjective 
complaints, and the symptoms describeid by her, e·pen if 
true, could not be a result of the acc~dent . 
... 
Reserving, for the moment, a recital of some of the 
evidence produced by the defendants, \Ve look at the 
Court's Instructions to the jury, in light with the: issues: 
Instruction No. 10. 
H If you find the issues in favor of the plain-
tiff ... it will be your duty to award the plaintiff 
such damages, if any, as you may find ... will 
fairly and adequately compensate her .... " 
"You may award such special damages . . . 
not to exceed the su1n of $2, 791.50. You may also 
a""ard such sum, if any, by reason of her being 
unable to work ... " 
"You may also a\vard such general damages, 
if any, you find the plaintiff is entitled to for her 
injuries . . . you may consider the nature and 
extent of the injuries sustained by her, the degree 
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and character of her suffering ... .and the extent 
to which she has been prevented from pursuing 
the ordinary affairs of life ..... The total must 
not exceed $35,000.00 .... " 
Pla~ntiff to our knowledge, made no exception to 
this instruction, an.d certa1.:nly dixl not cite it as .a ground 
for a new t·rial. 
· · . It seems to require no argument that if the jury 
is instructed that their verdict is not to exceed a certain 
sum, they are obviously being. instructed that they may 
bring in a lesser amount, which will "fairly and ade-
.qua~ely ~ompensate her." 
If the jury is instructed, relative to earnings, that 
they may award ·such sum, if any, the jury is also being 
advised that they may award ·nothing, which is exactly 
what the jury did, and with ample reason for their verdict 
in~.:·so doing. 
··.: We subniit that the ·Court's coining of a phrase, and 
concluding that the jury disregarded his instructions, 
wi·thout any foundation for said eonclusion, should not 
be permitted to stand in violation of defendants' rights 
as litigants. 
The Trial Court further stated as a reason for grant-
ing additur (R. 8) : 
" ... it appears to the Court ... that the 
award \ras inadequate in vie\\T of all the evidence 
on that i~~ue. It further appears that the verdict 
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\Vas given under the influence of passion or pre-
judice." 
\\"'" e invite this If onorable Court's attention to the 
t(lstitnony of Dr. Reed Smoot Clegg, l\f.D. "\vho was called 
by the def~ndants and \\Those testimony in full is found 
at pages 255 to 28-± of the Transcript. The follo\\;Jng, 
ho,vever, \viii indicate the gist of his testimony. 
Dr. Clegg, an Orthopedic Specialist, examined plain-
tiff pursuant to ('1ourt Order, on February 4, 1960 
(T-256). This examination included a "general survey, 
checking from head to feet," and special attention paid 
to \\There the patient has complaints on the above date: 
'~ ... the patient stated that her main com-
plaint \Vas pain in the neck area with radiation 
to,vards the shoulders . . . a dull aching pain, 
and at times there were sharp pains ... she had 
previously had trouble in her lower back but this 
had disappeared ... she 'vas unable to do heavy· 
physical activity because of this pain in the ne:ek 
. . . she occasionally had some numbness in her 
hands a·nd legs." 
X-rays \vere taken by Dr. Clegg, 'vhich 'vere neg-
ative, and "'vere essentially norn1al for a person of this 
age group." He did find, however, that there \vere ''early 
changes ... osteoarthritis 'vhich is commensurate with 
that of this age group" and \\Thich the Doctor stated was 
not unusuaL and not associated \\Tith the injury." 
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The Doctor concluded from his X-ray studies: 
"I found no evidence of injury in this par-
ticular patient." 
"Q. Now, with relation to your ... examination 
of: the muscles and so forth, what was your 
finding~ 
A. I found that the patient was essentially nor-
mally healthy and physically well developed 
otherwise ( T -259). 
(At T-260) 
Q. I will ask you if the symptoms she described 
to you with relation to the pain in the shoul-
ders is a nonnal symptom from a person 
suffering from a whiplash injury~ 
A. It is not ... and it was my feeling that the 
symptoms, the co1nplaints, and symptoms, did 
not fit with the so-called whiplash injury. 
(At T-281) 
Q. Did you find any pain on motion in your 
examination of l\Irs. Wellman~ 
A. I found that when I would ask where the 
pain was, that she would show me . . . tell 
me where, and point to it. And I found that 
by pressing on this area, that there was a 
delayed reaction {ro1n the tinte I applied pres-
sure until the respo-nse came that "that hurt." 
(Emphasis added). 
(At T-284) 
Q. Did you find any permanent disability in the 
case of Mrs. vV ellman' 
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A. No Sir." 
Bear in n1ind that nirs. Wellman testified to the 
follo,ving rP~idual complaints at the time of trial: 
~'I still have a headache ... where the neck 
and the skull join . . . the cold night air affects 
1ny neck; makes it 1nore painful." (T-132) 
H ••• any vibration, riding in a car, 'valking., 
and especially if I have high heels on ( aggra-
vates her pain) (While dancing) "The vibration 
from my heels, the dancing, having my arm up, 
1ny ar1n goes to sleep and also causes a spasm 
1n 1ny neck and shoulder." 
'~I still have a headache. It's there all the 
ti1ne, but it gets more severe if I have over-done, 
like using 1ny arms or any riding ... any vibra-
tion." T -133) 
.. They (neck and shoulders) get very tight 
at times and hurt me where I will stop whatever 
I happen to be doing and try to relax then1, and 
it doesn't always 'vork." 
'"Q. In the past, say, since the beginning of this 
year, has there been much of a change in 
your condition, either one 'vay or the other~ 
A. Yes, I believe I am getting worse." (T-124) 
The plaintiff's own doctor, Dr. J. ·C. vVoodward, 
:JI.D. testified: 
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(T-71) 
''Q. Did you find any fracture whatsoever of the 
bone structure of the patient's body? 
A. No. 
(T-82) 
Q. ". . . on your first examination, you listed 
her complaints, as nausea ... you had never 
been present when she vomited? 
A. No. 
Q. She was unable to do her housework, and of 
course, you didn't know personally about 
that? 
A. No. 
Q. Her neck was on fire, was there any way 
you could verify that from an . . . objective 
examination? 
A. No, that is entirely a subjective thing. 
(T-83) 
Q. How did you confirm she had had headaches T 
A. . .. I could confirm she 'vas certainly justified 
in such a complaint .... 
Q. . .. she had slight difficulty with her balance? 
. . . did you verify that Y 
A. I didn't have her ",.alk a straight line or any-
thing. 
Q. And her vision was blurred. Did you verify 
thatf 
A. No I did not. 
(T-84) 
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Q. The muscle in front (of the neck) did you 
notice sorne spasrn in that 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Based upon these findings, you immediately 
put her in the hospital? 
.. A. Yes." 
(T-79) The Doctor testified that he gave her about 
127 therapy treatments, and that in addition, she had 
had about 18 additional treatments in the hospital; for 
over a period of 11f2 years (T-120). 
Doctor Reed Clegg, M.D., testified that in his opin-
ion such a lengthy treatment with therapy was not rea-
sonable, giving his reasons as follows: 
(T-261) Referring to diathermy treatment: 
". . . in my experience., if a patient isn't 
responding to treatment in a few weeks, I would 
figure it is not a successful treatment. I would 
look for something else." 
(T-262) 
'" ... medicine is not as cut and dried as, per-
haps, we would like it to be. And there is an ele-
Inent of experimentation in treatment. We have 
our phases of ronservative measures and we feel 
since our patients respond readily to one thing 
and others don't, if o·Jr first phase of treatment 
isn't successful, then, to carry on over a long 
period of tiine is actually har·n1ful in some cases." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
". . . some patients begin to look f onvard to 
the temporary relief, and our aim is to give per-
manent relief, and if we carry on over a period 
of months and months, they look forward to the 
treatment and they are almost more convinced 
that there is more wrong than actually is." 
Plaintiff, unde,r Dr. Woodward's supervision, en-
gaged in daily home traction treatments for one and 
one-half years (T-121). 
Dr. Clegg further testified, with relation to traction 
treatments ( T -260) : 
''In my particular case traction treatment 
is usually the second phase of treatment and this 
is usually tried for a period of a fe'v days or a 
week, and if successful, then no further treatment 
is indicated. If it isn't successful, then, "'"e go on 
to the next stage of treatment." 
('T-261) 
"Q. I will ask you if it ""'onld be nonnal to con-
tinue traction, or reasonable, beyond three 
weeks period~ 
A. In my estimation it \vould not be." 
Certainly the above excerpts in no \Yay give a com-
prehensive account of all the testin1ony and evidence 
relative to the plaintiff's injury, and they are not in-
tended to do so. However, \Ye trust that enough of the 
conflicting testimony has been reYie,Yed to pinpoint the 
fact that there "'"as a definite joining of the issue of 
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damages, and that the jury "~as not presented 'vith a 
one-sided issue to determine. 
The jury a'varded $2500.00 Special Damages, and 
$~,000.00 General Da1nages. The Lo\\~er Court granted 
additur of $3,000.00 arul the plaintiff has filed a consent 
to the additur (R. 5-t-). 
\\T e presume, therefore, that the Honorable Trial 
Court and the plaintiff agree that if the jury believed 
every subjective complaint by plaintiff, as well as her 
overly helpful and ever believing doctor, $5,000.00 rather 
than $2,000.00 is an adequate award for General Dain-
ages. 
vVhat then, if the jury believed only half of the 
plaintiff's testimony concerning her subjective com-
plaints 1 Should the verdict then be $2,500.00·~ The 
ridiculosity of the attemp.t to rationalize why the verdict 
should be tampered with at all, is very apparent. 
This honorable Court, in Bodon vs. Suhrrntann, 8 
Utah 2nd 42, 327 P. 2nd, 826 and in Schneider vs. Sttthr-
mann, 8 lTtah 2nd 35, 327 P. 2nd, 822, have fully reviewed 
and established the basis upon 'vhich a jury verdict 
should or should not be disturbed. This Court states, 
in the S rh n eUler case at page 825 : 
H ••• the question of dan1ages for pe·rsonal 
injuries involving the intangibles of pain and 
suffering, with respret to 'Yhieh reasonable minds 
are apt to differ greatly, arP 1natters \\'"hieh a 
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jury is peculiarly adapted to detennine. One 
of the principal merits of the jury system is that 
it brings together people from different walks of 
life, with distinctive points of view arising out 
of their varied experiences. Bringing these dif-
ferent points of view to bear upon the appraisal 
of such values is a method to which the parties 
have a right." 
Obviously, the Trial·Court was more impressed with 
the plaintiff's evidence on damages, than \vas the jury. 
However, it is Hornbook Law that he may not set up 
his opinion against that of the jury, except under very 
rigid standards established by the Supreme Court. 
Test the Lower Court's conclusion that the award 
was inadequate, with the language of this Honorable 
Court in Jensen vs. D. & R. G. R. Conzpany, -!4 lTtah 100, 
138 Pac. 1185, at 1192 : 
" ... before the Court is justified (in setting 
aside a verdict) it should clearly be made to 
appear that the jury totally mistook or disregard-
ed the rules of law by \Yhich the damages 'vere 
to be regulated, or wholly misconceived or dis-
regarded all the evidence, and by so doing com-
mitted gross and palpable. error by rendering a 
verdict so enonnous or outrageo·ns or unjust as 
to be attributable to neither the charge nor the 
evidence, but onl~~ to passion and prejudice." 
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H (the Lo\Yer l~ourt's) action may ... be 
inquired into and reviPwed on an alleged abuse 
of discretion, or a capricious or arbitrary exer-
cise of power in ~uch rPspect. Such a review is 
not a revie\\' of n question of fact, but of law .... 
Our po,ver to correct a plain abuse of discretion 
or undo a mere capricious or arbitrary exercise 
of po\Yer cannot be doubted." 
\Ve submit also, that a ro1nplete review of the Record 
in the case at bar, 'vill completely fail to disclose one 
iota of evidence that the jury was in any way prejudiced 
against the plaintiff. This Court has previously held 
that the size of the ve·rdirt, standing alone, does not 
shO\\~ passion or prejudic0. 
ln 1-Jauly vs. 111 cCarthy ( 1947), 109 Utah 431, 184 
Pae. 2nd 123, at 126 : 
" ... in the mere fact that it was more than 
another jury, or more than the ·Court, might 
have given, or even more than the evidence justi-
fied, does not conclusively show that it "\Vas the 
result of passion or prejudice .... " 
H ••• no conduet on the part of the jury 
evincing passion or prejudice, has been called 
to our attention. The only point of complaint 
is the size of the verdict." 
vVe therefore submit, that the I-Ionorable Trial Judge 
abused his discretion in concluding that the award was 
inadequate, and that the Jury \ 7 erdict should be rein-
stated. 
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POINT TWO 
'THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN DEPRIVING THEM 
OF THEIR DEFENSES AND A NEW TRIAL, IF NECES-
SARY, SHOULD BE HEARD ON ALL THE ISSUES. 
IThe defendants' Answer alleged, as an affirmative 
defense, that the accident was unavoidable (R. 6). The 
Pre-Trial Order states: 
"The defendants deny that they were negli-
gent and claim as an affirmative defense that the 
driver of -defendants' vehicle 'vas confronted with 
a sudden peril and that the accident was unavoid-
able as far as the driver was concerned." (R. 10) 
Despite the definite framing of the issues, the Court 
refused defendants' requested instructions on foresee-
ability (R. 28), refused defendants' requested instruC-
tion on sudden peril (R. 30), and Unavoidable Accident 
(R. 2.7). 
We submit it as obvious, from the Courfs refusal, 
that he ruled that the defense of unavoidable accident 
would not be a proper defense, even if the jury "Tere to 
believe the defendants' version of the accident, and the 
circumstances leading up to it. 
'\Te further sub1nit, although it does not appear in 
the Record, that the Court 'Yas of the opinion that 
lmavoidable accident is not a proper defense in an 
automobile accident suit unless the facts bear out a 
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conclusion that the accident, if not the same as an "Act 
of God," are closely akin thereto. 
ln N elso·n vs. Lot!, S1 lT~tah 265, 17 Pac. 2nd at 275, 
this Court stated, in discussing the giving of an unavoid-
able accident instruction in an auto-pedestrian accident: 
" ... the \YTiter is inclined to think the jury 
\vould interpret the instruction to mean that if 
they should believe the injury to the plaintiff \Yas 
the result of unavoidable accident and not of 
negligence on the part of the defendant, their 
verdirt should bP in favor of defendant." 
Again, this Court in State vs. McQuillin, 113 Utah 
:2(iS, 193 Pac. 2nd, 433 ( 1948) stated: 
'"His (defendant's) version of the crucial 
i~sue \vas that he \vas suddenly confronted with 
a situation of peril which he could not avoid. 
Had the jur~T accepted such testimony as fact, 
a rerdict of acquvttal U'ould have been required 
in accordauce 1cith a specific instruction. of thP 
Cnurt to that effect." (E1nphasis added). 
\v ... e further feel, ""ith reasons not shown in the rec-
ord, that the Honorable Lower Court was unduly influ-
enced by a fairly recent pronouncen1ent by the California 
Supreme ~Court. In Buti,qan vs. Yellou' Cal; Co. (1958), 
49 Cal._ 2nd 652, 320 Pac. 2nd, 500, 65 ALR 2nd, 1, 
\Vherein the Court reversed prior decisions and an-
notmced: 
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"Unavoidable Accident has no place in our 
pleading .... it is nothing more than a denial by 
the defendant of negligence, or a contention that 
his negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause 
of the injury." 
We will let ~the Montana Supreme Court answer the 
above pronouncement. In Rodoni vs. Hoskin (Montana), 
355 Pac. 2nd, 296 (1960), at 299: 
"We decline to follo'v the holding of Butigan 
vs. Yellow Cab Co., supra, and conclude that the 
holding of Lucero vs. Torres (New Mexico) is 
better reasoned. It is our opinion that an instruc-
tion as to unavoidable accident could help the 
jury to understand the legal concepts involved 
in an ap.propriate case and would not confuse them 
or hinder them in reaching a just conclusion. 
However, an instruction as to unavoidable acci-
dent should be used with care and only allowed 
when the facts warrant it. It might be appropriate 
where there was surprise, sndden appearance and 
reasonably unanticipated presence of .a pedestrian, 
as 'vas stated in the Lucero case." 
In Lucero vs. Torres (1960), 67 N.M. 10, 350 Pac. 
2nd 1028, the New !fexico Supreme Court also rejected 
the California holding in the Bntigan case, stating: 
"We do not 1nean to say that every motor 
vehicle accident case 'Yarrants the giving of an 
unavoidable accident instruction. On the other 
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hand, the VPry nature of so1ne of the 1notor vehicle 
casPs, sueh a~ this, ~uggests the genuine questions 
of 1ner0 accident or tmavoidable accident, giving 
foundation for the instruction. A promiJnent fea-
ture 1nay be one of surprise, sudden appearance 
and re~asollably u 11anticipated presence of a pedes-
Irian, contbined u:i~th circumstances whi~ch present 
a fatr issue as to whether the faiJlure of a driver 
to anticipate or sooner to guard against the ,da11r 
ger or to avoid it, is consistent with a concl~tsion 
of hi,s due care. In sueh cases, the trial Courts 
are inclined to grant the instruction on unavoid-
able aecident and their action in so doing is gen-
erally approved by the Appellate ·Courts (citing 
precedents from many jurisdictions. (Above eln-
phasis added). 
In the case at bar, defendants' entire defense was 
based on the defense of unavoidahle accident, of which 
the elen1ents of reasonable foreseeability under the cir-
cumstances, and the p~resence of sudden peril from which 
defendant could not extricate himself, are necessary 
adjunct~. 
Defendant testified that he 'vas driving 'vi thin the 
posted speed limit; follo,ving the cars ahead at a safe 
distance; that it was wide open country where no inter-
secting high,vays 'vere to be expected: that he, as a 
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reasonable driver, should not be required to anticipate 
that a vehicle ahead would run out of gas, or even if it 
did so, it would be in an unlikely area where not even 
the tail lights of the cars ahead would be visible; that 
when he reached the crest of the crucial hill, the nearest 
vehicle was only 100 feet distant; that an opposite bound 
car prevented him from swerving; that the distance of 
100 feet made it impossible to stop (as verified by de-
fendant's expert witness, Laub (T·-208-214). 
Certainly, as stated in the Lucero case, supra, the 
elements of "surprise", "sudden appearance", "reason-
ably unanticipated presence of danger", are present and 
"combined with circumstances which present a fair issue 
as to whether the failure of the (defendant) to anticipate 
or sooner to guard against the danger or to avoid it, is 
consistent with a conclusion of due care." 
How could a panel of laymen, 'vith no understanding 
of the above principles, and 'vith no instructions from 
the Court, even be expected to take the above defenses 
into consideration from the mere fact that they 'vere 
instructed on the meaning of negligence 1 
In 65 ALR 2nd, the annotation sun1marizes the vari-
ous theories adopted by the different jurisdictions. \Y e 
submit, that under any of then1~ defendants in the case 
at bar, were entitled to the defense. These theories are 
listed a~ follows : 
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At page 32: 
There must be evidence in the record which 
\Vould give legal support to a finding that the 
o<·enrrence ron1plained of, \Vas of the nature indi-
catrd in the instrurtion. 
At page ..t-:3 : 
There Htust be evidence before the jury that 
the misadvPnture con1plained of, resulted from 
so1n'e c.ause other than negligence of one of the 
parties . 
.. .:-\ t page -±8 : 
The evidence 1nust present a specific theory 
under \vhich the accident could have happened 
not,vithstanding the fact that all the parties exer-
cised sneh degree of care as is required by law. 
At page 49: 
Evidence showing the presence of any agency 
or factor over "'"hich the parties had no control 
and \vhich, except by the exercise of exceptiJonal 
forrsi.qht, they could not have predicted. 
\\T e earnestly submit, therefore, that if a new trial 
1s necessary, defendants are entitled to have their de-
fensf fairly sub1nitted to a jury. 
It goes \vithout saying, that trials of la'v suits are 
expensive for the litigants. Trials, Appeals, and re-trials 
give rise to the layman's axiom that in a la\Y suit, "every-
one lose~ but the la,,~yers," a mif'conreption ,,·hirh the 
Bar has been ron1hatting for (lerades. 
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It is for the above reason, that the defendants here 
move this Court for an Order reinstating the jury verdict, 
which in fact is in favor of the plaintiff. The parties have 
had their day in Court; the jury has rendered its ver-
dict, and the defendants, despite the several errors com-
mitted against them, are willing that the litigation be 
closed. 
But if it be necessary, the defendants are certainly 
entitled to a fair t'rial, wherein their defenses are fairly 
presented to a jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS E. MIDGLEY, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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